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Abstract 
 
We present a novel lens on the presence and impact of qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFII) in the top shareholdings of the non-financial domestically listed Chinese ‘A’ share firms. Unlike 
prior cross sectional studies which use only annual data, this research runs a robust panel fixed effects 
model employing quarterly data, thereby capturing the presence of a foreign investor in these firms for 
the first time and with great precision, since relying on Q4 shareholdings could be misleading due to 
changes in ownership configurations intra annum. The initial results suggest that the presence of a 
QFII as a top shareholder in these companies is associated with their better performance, using both 
Tobin’s Q and ROA as the performance measures. We control for internal/external corporate 
governance mechanisms of Bai et al. (2003), ultimate ownership variables as suggested by Chen et al. 
(2009), foreign legal person shares, a proxy for international affiliations and a number of time variant 
firm characteristics (e.g. size, leverage, age etc). The exhaustive specification was reduced using 
principal component analysis and met with similar results. 
Economically, the coefficient of impact on the market measure is the more significant, while the 
effect of having a QFII in top shareholdings on both performance measures is empirically significant. 
Previously, studies have often ignored the potential for reverse causality beyond using lagged 
regressors. This is problematic. Therefore, we follow up with a 2SLS instrumental variables model and 
system GMM to further mitigate this potential and find the empirical relationship holds. Contrary to 
the work on QFIIs and governance post-implementation, the findings from our models suggest that in 
spite of their very low percentage holdings, we can tentatively interpret the presence of a QFII top 
shareholder has acted to augment market performance holding equal existing corporate governance 
mechanisms and other controls.  
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1. Introduction 
 
China adopted policy driven stock markets in the 1990s as part of the series of economic 
experiments that from 1978 have gradually mimicked various features of market economies, reneging 
on Mao’s command economic state. China now offers the most highly capitalized market in East Asia 
and the second in the world after the US, having marginally overtaken the UK in 2006 and Japan in 
2012. The relative long-term performance of the Chinese market since the financial crisis of 2008 versus 
developed markets has been lacklustre, yet the UK treasury and foreign and commonwealth office has 
been rallying for greater involvement in China for London asset managers1, and the Chinese side has 
been very gradually liberalizing the Chinese market. Foreign investment in these markets is clearly of 
import to investors, the companies and governance proponents. This paper revisits foreign share 
ownership in Chinese markets. Contrary to prevailing notions that policy objectives for introducing 
foreign investors, specifically QFII, failed during the last decade or so, this paper demonstrates that the 
QFII scheme has shown hints of success and explores why this is the case in the specific Chinese context.  
The key objectives for introducing foreign share ownership into Chinese listed companies has 
been threefold. Firstly, the Chinese listed firms want to raise foreign capital, increasing the capital 
available to them (Bohl, et al., 2009). Secondly, the Chinese have wanted western governance practices 
to be introduced into the domestically Chinese listed companies, beyond that minority of firms that had 
already achieved concurrent offshore/overseas listings (McGuiness & Ferguson, 2002). Thirdly, foreign 
investors are expected to carry out sophisticated analysis and employ investment strategies with a long-
term investment horizon (Ting, Yen & Chiu, 2008).  Introducing sophisticated investors can supposedly 
lead to fairer market valuations of firms which could offer mitigate the ‘overheating’ wrought from 
speculative rallies with little fundamental basis—both volatility and high price-earnings ratios that 
emerges often attributed to rampant speculation on the stock market within China.  
World Bank researchers Kim, Ho & St Giles (2003, p. 43) opined that qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII) would have an impact mid-long term on Chinese capital markets 
development and ‘eventually on the method by which PRC listed companies handle corporate 
governance issues’. Investors have thus had high hopes of their contribution to governance (Kang, et 
al., 2008). Both investors and policymakers have therefore expected that foreign investors could have 
a positive impact on mainland Chinese listed company performance by augmenting corporate 
governance mechanisms (Kang, et al., 2008; Tan, 2009). More recently in 2015 and 2016, Chinese 
regulators have attempted to bring in more foreign investment from launched Hong Kong and planned 
London to Shanghai (and Shenzhen) connect programmes. With recent developments, this is set to 
increase further. In late 2016, UK foreign secretary Phillip Hammond announced the success of policy 
negotiations with the Chinese government through the 8th UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, 
in which the London-Shanghai stock connect programme, it was announced, would advance forward as 
part of a long-term strategic plan. These programmes specifically seek to stimulate investment into 
mainland Chinese listed companies.  
This paper investigates the foreign investment—performance relation in non-financial Chinese 
enterprises without an overseas listing, a rather under-researched sub-universe, conditioning on the 
internal and external governance mechanisms identified by Bai, Liu, Lu, Song & Zhang (2003), among 
others, which have become a staple in the analysis of Chinese corporate governance standards, see e.g. 
Sami, Wang & Zhou (2011). 
Taking an econometric approach to a hybrid agency/resource-based governance—performance 
framework, our results show a positive association between QFII presence in a firm and company 
                                                     
 
1  See Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP & HM Treasury, 10/11/2016. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-china-8th-economic-and-financial-
dialogue-policy-outcomes accessed 21/4/2017. 
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performance, using standardized book and market measures, and we tentatively posit this relation as 
causal. This may seem quite surprising given QFII’s sparsity and lack of formal voting rights in 
companies. However, we suggest that in China, foreign investors have had a form of monitoring power 
that is overly commensurate to their ownership stake and offer plausible reasons why this is likely to 
be the case. 
We look exclusively at QFII positions in top shareholdings of what we term the non-financial ‘A’ 
share only companies (henceforth NASOs—see Appendix 3)2 for the first time. More specifically, by 
teasing out the QFII shareholdings in a large sample of NASOs and running our models, it appears 
firstly, that the presence of foreign shareholders does seem to be associated with better performance 
and we argue that there is a causal element to this; secondly, considering they have very low voting 
rights in the companies, the significance of their presence in our models implies that their influence 
outweighs their presence in percentage terms. Thirdly, this study serves to indicate that the benefits of 
foreign strategic investors in the Chinese banking sector could be transliterated into the case of the non-
financial listed companies by way of policies conducive to higher levels of foreign ownership and 
activism. Fourthly, we add to the categorization of investors as pressure-sensitive and pressure-
insensitive by adding a third passive-reactive category, whereby indirect monitoring pressure can exist 
through the potential of a foreign investor in China to move markets3, in spite of not necessarily having 
an active or direct interest in the company’s governance or model/strategy, through the exit signal they 
offer to a vast retail and institutional trading market in China, or through other modes of reaction such 
as informing the international media of their poor experience of corporate governance with an invested 
company. 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows:  
This introduction (1) precedes an institutional setting section focused on the Chinese stock market 
and foreign investors (2). This is a single-country study. Therefore, a section exploring the nuances of 
the Chinese case is warranted.  
Section (2) is followed by the literature review (3), which focuses on the corporate governance 
story with particular reference to agency theory and applications to the Chinese case. 
The data and methodology section (4) explain how the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) datasets were amalgamated and utilised to determine the presence of qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFII) appearing in the top shareholding positions. 
Moreover, this section introduces the econometrics to be employed in the subsequent sections, 
including the baseline OLS model, fixed effects model and variables.  
Descriptive statistics and regression results (5) follow on from this part. A discussion and analysis 
(6) puts forward interpretations of the research and the paper is then rounded off with the conclusion 
and suggestions for further research (7). 
 
  
                                                     
 
2 In other words, it neither includes financial firms in the analysis, nor excludes the domestically listed 
companies which have successfully attracted foreign investment. This is also contrary to banking efficiency 
studies, e.g.  Lu, Shen, Wu M. and Wu Z. (2010), who focus exclusively on the financial sector2. 
 
3 i.e. Generate a herd response advertently or inadvertently, through producing a signal by their exit. 
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2. Institutional Setting 
 
Foreign investors have been granted access to the tradable A shares in China since the 
introduction of the QFII scheme in February 2002, with its practical instigation on 23 May, 2003 
(Young, et al., 2011). This officially introduced the possibility of foreign institutional investor 
ownership in the ‘A’ shares of domestically listed Chinese firms (Yeo, 2003; Hu, 2001). One of the 
aims of QFII was to introduce foreign investors who could improve Chinese markets through their 
investment and management skills in addition to testing out relaxation of foreign exchange controls on 
the capital account (Tam, et al., 2008). 
The ‘Provisions on Issues Concerning the Implementation of “the Administrative Measures for 
Domestic Securities Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors”’ were issued on 27 July, 
2012 by the CSRC. These new rules have reduced the assets under management (AUM) requirement 
for QFII scheme applicants from $5 billion US to $50 million US for asset management, insurance and 
‘other’ institutions, requiring them to have only two years of operating experience versus the five 
previously required, while commercial banks require only half the previous requirement of $10 billion 
US in AUM and no longer require to be global top 100 banks. The aggregate holdings of 20% in a 
single Chinese company has risen to a ceiling of 30% and holdings by a single QFII in a single company 
may be 10% rather than only 5% as previously4. The applications process has been streamlined, no 
longer requiring a face-to-face meeting (Leckie & Xiao, 2012; Robinson, et al., 2013). Moreover, these 
are provisions, suggesting flexibility in future. 
QFII seems to have accelerated rapidly, from 169 in number in 2012 to 237 at year-end 2013 
(Shih, 2013)5. Their timing and performance in late 2008 and Q1-Q2 2009 were impressive, particularly 
their having skin in the game when domestic investors were not invested in Chinese equities (Guilloux, 
2011). The regulators thus steadily increased QFII quotas and reduced approval requirements, 
continuing in their affirmative stance as regards the positive effect of their presence.  
 
…[Chinese capital markets] showing significant potentials for attracting foreign investors 
compared with the proportion of shares held by foreign capital in overseas markets. In the next 
phase, the CSRC will further speed up the development of QFIIs and RQFIIs, enhance coordination 
with relevant authorities and improve the capital inflow and outflow procedures and income tax 
policy in respect of foreign investors, with a view to attracting more long-term foreign capital, 
promoting the reform and development of capital markets, and better facilitating the adjustment, 
transformation and upgrade of China's economic structure. 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2013) 
 
The progression of QFII from inception to 2012 is highlighted in Appendix 2. Approved QFIIs 
cover the range of institutional investors – pension funds, insurance companies, corporates, private 
banks, banking trusts, asset management companies, sovereign wealth funds and endowment funds – 
all of whom seek to invest in Chinese securities. According to Leckie & Xiao (2012), QFII quotas are 
70-90% invested into A shares within the first six months of license and foreign exchange approval, 
with the value of all QFII investments being estimated at USD40 billion and the process accelerating 
of late.  
                                                     
 
4 http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2266933.htm accessed 2 February, 2014 
5 Shih, Toh Han, for South China Morning Post, 12 November 2013, ‘QFII quota tipped to make up 10pc 
of Chinese market’ – accessed 28-4-14 from http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-
finance/article/1353320/qfii-quota-tipped-make-10-pc-chinese-market 
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In June 2013, the CSRC announced it would increase aggregate QFII quotas to $150 billion US. 
This was affirmed in January 2014 at the Asia Financial Forum in Hong Kong, by the head of the CSRC6, 
Guo Shuqing (Tan & Chen, 2013) and confirmed to be the case by the vice-chief of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), Xianghong Deng7.  
While announcing the increase in foreign quotas might be aimed at facilitating market buoyancy, 
it nevertheless points to the long-term trajectory of encouraging higher levels of participation in listed 
company share ownership by QFII and development of Chinese capital markets, even if the analysis 
from the inside appears somewhat vague: 
 
Since its implementation in 2002, the pilot for QFII arrangements have been enjoying sound 
and steady operation, playing a positive role in expanding institutional investor base and sources 
for long-term funds, introducing long-term investment and value investment concepts as well as 
further opening up capital markets… 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2013) 
 
Due to the combination firstly of ownership level and eligibility restrictions, secondly, overseas 
availability of some companies’ shares in markets with better investor protection and thirdly, a lack of 
investable firms either through poor quality, or poor analyst coverage, QFIIs’ appearance has been 
sparse on aggregate as QFII has a very small proportion of holdings relative to market capitalization, a 
little over 1.3% of negotiable shares are held by QFII and just under a little over 0.8% if all shares 
(tradable and so-called non-tradable8) are considered. However, a small percentage of a Chinese 
company’s shares can be substantial in dollar terms, given the size and capitalization of many of China’s 
listed companies.  
Moreover, there could be a dramatic acceleration on the cards/etched on the tortoise’s shell. In 
June 2013, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced it would increase the 
QFII quotas to $150 billion US. This was affirmed in January 2014 at the Asia Financial Forum in Hong 
Kong, by the head of the CSRC, Guo Shuqing (Tan and Chen, 20139).  
Thus, examining the QFII is a matter of great interest. Appendix 3 shows the illustrates QFII 
investments over the years and by industry in 2012. Appendix 3 gives an eclectic perspective on foreign 
investment into Chinese stocks more broadly, covering the range of opportunities foreign investors have 
for exposure and the ways in which they show up in company shareholding configurations. 
 
 
                                                     
 
6 The CSRC is a ministry level organization jointly responsible for capital markets regulation alongside 
the twin sharer of capital markets regulation with the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
 
7 Mr Deng was on record at a conference held on 8-9 May, 2014 at the London Metropolitan University in 
saying that this quota is now available but is not yet being used up by foreign investors. 
 
8 Prior to non-tradable share reform in China (2005-2007) only roughly one third of shares were officially 
‘tradable’, the rest being non-tradable shares by official status, such as state-owned legal person shares, 
employee shares, and a myriad of other types of share. 
9  Tan, Clement and Chen, Michelle, 13 January, 2013 for Reuters:  
‘China can increase 10 times the level of RQFII, QFII quotas -CSRC head’ Accessed 22/4/2014 from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/14/china-rqfii-idUSH9N09R00Y20130114 
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3 Literature Review 
 
Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
 
In the absence of mechanisms to direct their behaviour towards the maximization of firm value 
for shareholders, managers are by default economically self-interested and thus veer towards asset 
expropriation for personal gain if unmonitored (Jensen, 1986). This can take the form of empire 
building, direct expropriation of cash and sanctioning favourable transactions to related parties at the 
expense of the shareholder, for example. Managers have their own objectives, such as maximizing their 
income and enjoying perquisites (Grossman & Hart, 1982). Firm behaviour is predicted through this 
model. Agency problems can be reduced by good corporate governance mechanisms (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). 
Principally, agency theory proposes that (1) ownership concentration, (2) board representation, 
(3) board leadership, and (4) CEO incentives have roles in mitigating the agency problem. Research has 
found it difficult to come to a conclusion about ‘one size fits all’ good governance mechanisms though, 
especially with regard to applying ‘western’ corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. the ‘Anglo-
American’ or ‘Germanic’ models, to emerging markets. For example, Leng (2009) praises China’s 
dynamic adaptive approach to reforming corporate governance, rejecting the notion of universal good 
corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, the CSRC has pushed for corporate governance improvement, especially since 
1998 with attempts to separate management in listed companies from their SOE parents, followed by 
the 2001 adoption of OECD recommendations in the Chinese Code of Conduct for good governance, 
revisions to the Company and Securities Laws of China in 2006 and the non-tradable share reform of 
2005-2007, in addition to the gradual approach to welcoming foreign portfolio and strategic investors 
into the ownership mix. Foreign investors have been attributed with the wherewithal to assist in meeting 
such policy objectives. For example:   ‘…to bring in foreign advanced managerial experience, 
technology and capital, to improve the corporate governance standard of listed companies, and to 
protect the interests of listed companies and the shareholders’ (CSRC, 2005b: Article 1).   
 
Foreign Investors, Corporate Governance and Performance  
 
Other economies studied in the corporate governance and ownership vein include emerging 
economies such as Russia (Blasi & Shleifer, 1996); India (Douma, et al., 2006); Thailand 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001) and Eastern European transition countries (Claessens, et al., 2000), South 
Korea (Campbell & Keys, 2002; Baek, et al., 2004; Kim & Lee, 2003; Goyal & Bae, 2010) and Malaysia 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). A study by Mitton (2002) looks at South Korea plus several ASEAN 
countries during the Asian financial crisis. 
Many studies support the notion that allowing shares to be bought by foreign institutional 
investment serves to improve the performance of listed firms in developing economies. This can take 
place by way of their monitoring capability and to a degree, transfer of experience, along with a 
reduction in state ownership having a positive effect, e.g. Xu and Wang, (1997), Shleifer (1998); Qi et 
al., (2000). It has thus been suggested that corporate governance may be able to ‘travel around the world’ 
(Arggawal, et al., 2011) and that foreign investors may act as a positive governance and performance 
improving mechanism, e.g.  Meginson and Netter, (2001); Bai, et al., (2003) and Arggarwal, et al., 
(2011). 
Moroever, Tóth and Zemčík (2006) found that in the long term, Czechoslovakian enterprises that 
had transitioned from state to private ownership structures performed better given the presence of 
foreign owners. Sabirianova-Peter, Švejnar, and Terrell (2005) demonstrated that firms in Russia 
exhibited high efficiency when they were foreign owned and Makhija and Spiro (2000) concluded that 
ownership stakes of foreigners are positively related to share values.   
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Bai, et al. (2003) found a positive performance association with Chinese companies having either 
a B or H share listing. Thus, issuing shares to foreign investors was considered a significantly positive 
corporate governance mechanism, increasing market performance of firms.  They highlighted that 
China has a preponderance of corporate governance concerns, particularly relating to corrupt activities; 
that the SOEs in China were 1/3 ‘marginally’ profit-making and 2/3 loss-making at the time and that 
poor performance is intrinsically linked with corporate governance problems. 
However, Qi et al. (2000) found exclusive foreign share proportion having a negative or 
insignificant impact on return on equity (ROE) and Sun & Tong (2002) found a foreign shareholder 
proxy insignificant in their analysis of the Chinese case.  
 
Foreign investors as a corporate governance mechanism 
 
On the one hand, much of the aforementioned research into single economies suggests a causal 
relation between foreign investment, corporate governance and company performance. Moreover, 
Gillan & Starks (2003) suggest that foreign institutional investors are active proponents of corporate 
governance. There is the question of foreign investors’ potential passivity with regard to promoting 
governance though, particularly among portfolio investors. Qualitative research such as Michael Tan’s 
(see below) have supported this. Kaur and Gill (2008) argue that foreign institutional investors tend to 
operate on the principle of portfolio diversification with typically no other relation to the company 
except for their financial investment. Thus, foreign portfolio investors have been regarded to lack both 
sufficient incentive and ownership power to actively contribute to corporate governance directly.  
Moreover, foreign investors’ governance approach could be dampened due to the pressure 
sensitive combination of high monitoring costs and business ties (Almazan, et al., 2005). They face a 
free-rider problem when acting individually in active monitoring (Keasey & Short, 2005). On the other 
hand, foreign owners may be active monitors as institutional investors or ‘pressure insensitive’ (Gillan 
& Starks, 2003; Arggarwal, et al., 2011) and thus active in governance promotion. 
Arggarwal et al. (2011), found from a multi-country study that foreign investment seems to play 
a crucial role in promoting corporate governance outside the US, especially in countries with weaker 
shareholder protection. In support of this notion, better governance and performance of Chinese 
companies has been implied for those Chinese companies with simultaneous onshore and 
offshore/overseas and domestic listings (henceforth OODL firms) and thus having shares available 
exclusively for foreign purchase10 (Bai, et al., 2003; Zhou, et al., 2011)  
On the other hand, Sun & Tong (2002) found their lack of uniform evidence in this direction a 
surprising feature of the Chinese case. Others have either found an overseas listing negligible or 
negatively associated with performance (Qi, et al., 2000), did not include it in their analysis (Xu & 
Wang, 1997), or did not find much qualitative evidence from interviews to support foreign investors (as 
QFII) having a uniform active interest in corporate governance of Chinese listed companies (Tan, 2009).  
In the Indian case, Balasubramanian, et al. (2008, p. 19) found foreign ownership in Indian listed firms 
sparse and insignificant, with median and mean foreign ownership 2.9% and 8% respectively in Indian 
firms. Therefore, China is not necessarily unique among emerging economies if indeed there has been 
a failure to benefit from the expected corporate governance magic of foreign investors.  
However, many of the Chinese studies have been too early to assess QFII investment into the 
domestic Chinese ‘A’ shares. For example, Zhou, et al. (2011) seem to ignore entirely the foreign 
investment that has been allowed into domestic Chinese shares. Mcguiness and Ferguson (2005) take a 
more holistic approach, but their focus is only on mainland assets listed in Hong Kong.  
                                                     
 
10 NB That doesn’t mean that a share purchaser is not simply an ethnic Chinese or a mainland Chinese person 
living outside of the geographic jurisdiction of the People’s Republic with access to offshore/overseas 
shareholdings. It includes Hong Kongers also as foreign investors. 
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The only exception seems to have been Michael Tan (2009), who conducted a telephone 
interview study of QFIIs during 2006-2008. Although he found some mechanisms of engagement, for 
example, ‘training and advisory sessions’ offered by QFII (Tan, 2009; Tan, 2013), he failed to find 
uniform interest in corporate governance issues by QFII qualitatively. His conclusion is essentially 
therefore that QFII’s impact on corporate governance has been limited. Thus, the twin regulators, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and CSRC were prompted to work on the foreign 
strategic investor (FSI) program and to try to fix the Chinese banks first by utilizing foreign partners. 
FSI would be allowed concurrently into approved SOEs, while continuing to tentatively enhance QFII 
(see ibid: 2013).  
However, Tan’s conclusions with reference to his own research were based only on nine 
respondents out of a possible fifty nine QFII in 2007, interviewed by telephone. Therefore, it may have 
been somewhat premature to reject these smaller foreign investors as a governance mechanism in China 
without empirical investigation. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that foreign 
investors have been too small to be effective in promoting or specifically improving standards of 
corporate governance, especially given the Balasubramanian, et al. (2008) findings on India. However, 
without further researching the academic question, Tan’s could also be a post hoc ergo propter hoc11 
argument.  
There are three issues which arise from the above. The first is that foreign investment is deemed 
insignificant in earlier studies or has not been used at all as a variable, sometimes due to very sparse 
participation. The second concerns data for use. B shares may no longer function as an appropriate 
variable proxying for foreign ownership because since 2001 they have been tradable for domestic 
investors. H shares are specifically for foreign investors, but few firms issue them. Therefore we focus 
on the companies without these shares – domestically listed A share only companies. The third issue is 
a need to deal with biasedness and inconsistency in simply pooling the data together in addition to the 
potential for bi-directional causality in the foreign investment—performance relationship. We begin to 
address this through a number of robustness steps. 
The study therefore contributes to the line of research exploring the notion that foreign 
shareholders are associated with augmenting governance and thence, performance, e.g. Meginson & 
Netter (2001); Tóth & Zemčík (2006) and Arggarwal, Erel & Ferreira (2011). It is particularly indebted 
to the corporate governance model of Bai, et al. (2003). Moreover, it builds on earlier work tackling 
corporate governance and performance in the Chinese domestically listed companies, e.g. Xu & Wang 
(1997), Qi, Wu & Zhang (2000), Wei & Varela (2003) and Chen, Firth & Xu (2009). It identifies high 
QFII positions in firms and uses both their presence and percentage holdings for the first time. 
 
 
4. Data & Methodology 
 
Data 
 
The dataset employed is novel in that firstly, QFII in the shareholding configurations of Chinese 
NASOs have not been looked at empirically before. Secondly, taking only year-end data (like 
Arggarwal, et al., 2011) ignores that shareholders of interest might be present in Q1-Q3 in each year, 
but sell before the start of Q4. Thirdly, short panels have precluded the meaningful use of fixed effects 
models previously (e.g. Bai, et al, 2003 used T=3 annual data and random effects). 
Our focus in this paper is therefore exclusive of both the finance sector in China and the firm’s 
that have achieved segmented or overseas/offshore listings. There are three good reasons for this. Firstly, 
bear in mind the latter two categories of company are a vast minority in number and by no means 
                                                     
 
11 Latin—‘after this, therefore because of this’ 
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mutually exclusive either. Xu and Wang (1997) took this approach. Secondly, the focus of this paper is 
on the non-financial listed companies, since financial firms are likely to have fundamentally different 
cash-flow and accrual processes (Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008). Moreover, domestically listed A share 
only companies attracting foreign investment tend not to be in the financial sector, but in industry (see 
table 2). 
Thus, exploring the ramifications of foreign investment into the complement of Chinese listed 
firms seems to be a particularly pertinent line of enquiry. Such A share only (henceforth ASO) Chinese 
companies do not have a B share, nor offshore/overseas listing (H share, S share, etc). In other words, 
they are not OODL. Yet they are the largest subset of companies issuing shares that offer a claim to 
mainland Chinese productive assets. We call non-financial ASOs, ‘NASOs’. Appendix 5 gives some 
examples of each company under this method of categorization, for clarification. 
The dataset offers a sample of approximately 32,000 observations across a quarterly time 
dimension from 2003 to 2012, with coverage of over 1100 Chinese firms listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen, 
and was derived from a number of Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) datasets, 
themselves compiled from annual reports and securities data.  
In order to tease out the QFII investors’ presence vs. other investors, a list of all QFII companies 
from the outset of the QFII scheme onward was compiled from Z-Ben Investors data cross-referenced 
with CSRC and Global Times announcements. The final list was cross-checked again with the list in 
Leckie & Xiao (2012). Each company for each firm quarter was then scrutinized for the presence of 
any of the 169 QFII granted a license by the end of 2012 in the top ten shareholdings. 
 
Hypothesis development 
 
We therefore provide a detailed table of expectations for all variables in Appendix 6 from which 
hypotheses could be explicitly stated. For the purpose of this paper though, we are interested specifically 
in QFII and focus on the following hypotheses in the models presented, stated below in their null form. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: QFII are not associated with better performing Chinese companies in terms of their 
accounting performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: QFII are not associated with better performing Chinese companies in terms of their 
market performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: QFII do not have an association with Chinese company accounting performance 
dependent on the extent of their presence in the ownership configuration of the company 
 
Hypothesis 2b: QFII do not have an association with Chinese company market performance dependent 
on the extent of their presence in the ownership configuration of the company 
 
Hypothesis 3: QFII do not impact Chinese company performance, conditioning on existing corporate 
governance measures. 
 
 
Empirical Model 
 
There are two main baseline theoretical models for studies considering firm performance as a 
function of corporate governance mechanisms. They have generally been formulated in terms of 
ownership structure, e.g. Chen (2005) and Chen, et al. (2009), or a set of corporate governance variables 
or indices, which can also include ownership structure, e.g. Bai, et al. (2003). 
The generic specification below gives the pooled OLS model: 
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Pit= it +Git + εit   (1) 
 
Where Performance (P) of individual firm i at time t is modelled as a function of Governance 
related variables and controls (G) and epsilon represents stochastic error. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Xu and Wang (1997), Qi, et al. (2000) and Wei, Hassan & Varela (2003) all use return on assets 
(ROA) as a profitability measure in one way or another. Both Bai et al (2003) and Chen (2005) use 
Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) take on Tobin’s Q by taking current assets from the sum of the market value 
of a firm’s stock, the book value of long-term debt, the book value of inventories and the book value of 
current liabilities, and dividing by the book value of total assets. We use each of these two measures as 
dependent variables, ROA (net profit divided by total assets12) as a direct measure of accounting 
profitability and Tobin’s Q (TOB) as a market measure of raised capital value scaled by firm asset 
replacement costs, although we use total book value of debt as the market measure of debt due to the 
absence of a market measure for corporate debt in the vast majority of Chinese firms. 
 
Tobin’s Q = (market cap + book value of long term debt + book value of inventories + current liabilities) 
/ book value of total assets 
 
ROA = net profit / total assets 
 
Independent Variables 
 
We want to condition on corporate governance mechanisms that the literature has identified for 
better or for worse, in order to avoid omitted variable bias in the estimate of our coefficient on QFII 
presence. Thus, an adaptation of the Bai, et al. (2003) framework which seems to be becoming a 
standard for the Chinese case, see, for example, Shuhua Yao (2010) and Zhou, et al. (2009). We also 
draw on suggestions to address ultimate ownership in Chinese listed enterprises (e.g. Chen et al., 2009) 
and extend the model to include other internal and external governance-related proxies and firm 
characteristic controls. Our variable of interest is the presence of a QFII in the top shareholdings 
(QFI/QFH), a binary variable. The details of all variables are set out in appendix 7. 
 
Robustification 
 
Foreign investors might choose to invest in companies with either existing good governance or 
a good performance trajectory. Their experience and resources could afford them the desirable traits of 
being both good at picking stocks and good at timing the market, or at least able to sort the wheat from 
amongst the chaff between Chinese listed stocks. This of course assumes a degree of market inefficiency 
and thus professional investor arbitrage opportunities given their specialised knowledge, research 
capability, sophistication, conventionally accepted.  
                                                     
 
12 Since net profit is more likely to be manipulated for reporting purposes (Boubakri, et al., 2012), we also 
use alternatives, such as total profit and EBIT a numerator to provide alternative measures, but they make 
little material difference to the results and thus are unreported. Similarly Market-to-book ratio was used in 
place of Tobin’s Q as an alternative market measure. 
12 
 
 
If foreign investors choose the best performing firms, there could be an issue of reverse causality 
to address. We firstly apply fixed effects and lags of the explanatory variables which will reduce the 
endogeneity bias. Thus the model becomes: 
. 
Pit= it +1 G*it +2Q* it + ai + t* +uit 
 
Where G* is simply the independent variable matrix without the endogenous variable Q and a 
represents individual/industry effects and t, time effects.  
Adding appropriate instrumental variables to the model can lead to obtaining an unbiased 
estimate of the effect of the explanatory variable(s) on the dependent variable using two-stage least 
squares (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). We further resort to instrumental specifications 
using the market measure dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) to address this.  
 
Instrument choices 
 
QFI and MFJ need to be instrumented for. Since foreign investors possess ‘depth [to] their 
fundamental research and relatively sophisticated approach to risk management and selection’ (Leckie 
& Xiao, 2012, p. 17), it is likely they will price net profit in their investment decisions, whereas the 
market is unlikely to reflect it. This may extend to foreign joint venture mutual funds. We therefore use 
the log of net profit as one instrument. On the same basis that foreign investors are good forecasters, 
but that the Chinese market is not good at pricing future firm growth, we use the projected sales in the 
next quarter as a second instrument.  
The fourth lag of the QFII variable is considered valid theoretically, since a QFII four periods 
prior is unlikely to be correlated with the current quarter’s market performance and QFII can (and do) 
relatively easily hop in and out of their positions in China. In other words, QFII four periods in the past 
reflect QFII interest in the company, not necessary by the same QFII investor though—it is an 
instrument for current QFII investment. The QFII ownership several periods earlier ought to already be 
reflected in the price by this time, so should be uncorrelated with current Tobin’s Q. The market has 
had substantial time to reflect the QFII investment in the price of the stock.  
However, QFII are likely to have a limited number of stocks they will select as investable for 
three reasons: a lack of research into the A share stock universe, a lack of quality companies to invest 
in and familiarity with a specific rotation of shares. Therefore, a prior QFII presence may be correlated 
with present QFII.  
The third lag of QFII presence could be correlated with the presence of a sino-foreign mutual 
fund, due either to a tendency to follow QFII portfolios, or in that such institutions are identifying 
similarly investable stocks, but again this is less likely to show correlation with ‘today’s’ Tobin’s Q. 
This follows the same reasoning in terms of the unlikelihood of QFII at t-4 being correlated with the 
current market performance measure. 
At least one more instrument than endogenous regressor is therefore used satisfying the 
overidentification requirements of the IV and GMM models below. These instruments are tested for 
empirical validity, including endogeneity in the structural equation, overidentification and goodness of 
fit of the first stage model. 
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5. Descriptive Statistics & Regression Results 
 
Table 1 shows pairwise correlation coefficients for the pooled data. Even the higher correlations 
are not particularly high, generally being under |0.39| with most well below a |0.1| product moment 
correlation coefficient, i.e. very weak. The gross correlations indicate that multicollinearity seems not 
to be a severe issue. Size and capital structure are the most correlated against the dependent variables 
so we would expect them to be significant, possibly with higher t-statistics and lower standard errors 
accordingly in the regressions. Profit-to-sales ratio is not included in the ROA regressions as the 
variables are too closely related and liquidity is considered irrelevant in the ROA regressions—there is 
little intuition for why share liquidity would causally effect book sales per assets.  
Table 2 shows summary statistics. There is variation both between and within individuals 
(reported for key variables), supporting the use of panel methods, with Tobins Q varying between 0.382 
and 7.752 and ROA ranging -2.652 to 2.81 with means of 1.8 and 0.02 and standard deviations of 1.2 
and 0.06 respectively. Tobin’s Q varies more within an individual firm than between firms and ROA 
varies about as much between firms as it does within firms over time. 
Regression results are presented in tables 3 and 4 (expansion of table 3 in appendix 7) and are 
discussed in the following section. 
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Table 1: Gross (pooled) Pearson Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables 
 
 TOB ROA QFI QF5 MFJ FLP FRE FUC CEN LOC PRI OTU SHC SHQ MFC BSH IND CEO NNP OCH RCV SIZ DAR AGE LIQ CAP RCV PRO 
TOB 1.00                            
ROA 0.13 1.00                           
QFI 0.04 0.08 1.00                          
QF5 0.02 0.05 0.39 1.00                         
MFJ 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.09 1.00                        
FLP 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 1.00                       
FRE 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.31 1.00                      
FUC 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.17 0.24 1.00                     
CEN -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.19 1.00                    
LOC -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.41 1.00                   
PRI 0.14 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.10 -0.16 -0.58 -0.35 1.00                  
OTU 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.11 1.00                 
SHC -0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.04 0.11 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.14 0.13 -0.23 -0.07 1.00                
SHQ -0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.22 -0.06 0.98 1.00               
MFC 0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.16 -0.17 0.28 0.04 -0.73 -0.72 1.00              
BSH 0.10 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.23 -0.15 0.40 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.23 1.00             
IND 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.08 1.00            
CEO 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.11 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.13 0.05 1.00           
NNP 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.37 0.39 -0.02 0.18 -0.06 0.02 1.00          
OCH 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.13 -0.17 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 1.00         
RCV -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 1.00        
SIZ -0.33 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.36 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.23 -0.20 -0.01 0.23 0.24 -0.22 -0.12 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.15 1.00       
DAR -0.13 -0.33 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0.13 0.14 1.00      
AGE 0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.18 -0.16 -0.03 -0.25 0.10 -0.02 -0.38 0.07 -0.04 0.25 0.17 1.00     
LIQ 0.34 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.15 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.24 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 0.04 1.00    
CAP 0.06 -0.19 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.05 1.00   
RCV -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 1.00 -0.15 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 1.00  
PRO 0.11 0.69 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.14 0.14 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.11 0.17 -0.32 -0.03 0.09 -0.17 -0.11 1.00 
 
Table Note: Numbers in the matrix denote correlation coefficients. T-statistics are omitted since it is a very large sample and thus these are naturally quite high in most cases. More 
intuitive understanding from the matrix can be gained from observation of the correlation coefficient and higher absolute value coefficients are discussed above. Associated p-values available 
on request.  
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Table 2: Panel variables descriptive statistics 
 
VARIABLE SD TYPE MEAN SD MIN MAX OBS 
TOB Overall 1.830 1.232 0.382 7.752 44165 
TOB Between  0.877 0.435 6.222 1907 
TOB Within  0.944 -1.551 7.994 46 
ROA Overall 0.021 0.061 -2.652 2.810 44627 
ROA Between  0.038 -0.399 0.199 1964 
ROA Within  0.053 -2.419 2.742 46 
QFI Overall 0.063 0.243 0 1 42850 
QF5 Overall 0.002 0.018 0 0.788 42712 
QF10 Overall 0.002 0.016 0 0.702 42712 
MFJ Overall 0.338 0.473 0 1 42850 
FUC Overall 0.050 0.217 0 1 45832 
FRE Overall 0.075 0.263 0 1 45832 
FLP Overall 0.052 0.223 0 1 45832 
SHC Overall 0.380 0.162 0.008 0.894 45791 
SHQ Overall 0.170 0.137 0.000 0.799 45791 
MFC Overall -10.420 1.304 -15.120 -7.851 45789 
BSH Overall 0.038 0.124 0 3.857 42689 
IND Overall 0.358 0.053 0 0.800 42380 
CEO Overall 0.328 0.469 0 1 45725 
NNP Overall 1.066 1.155 0 38.920 45694 
OCH Overall 0.938 0.241 0 1 45832 
CEN Overall 0.403 0.491 0 1 45832 
LOC Overall 0.196 0.397 0 1 45832 
PRI Overall 0.329 0.470 0 1 45832 
FUC Overall 0.050 0.217 0 1 45832 
OTU Overall 0.022 0.147 0 1 45832 
SIZ Overall 1.073 0.052 0.954 1.269 44832 
DAR Overall 0.504 0.262 0.008 7.914 44586 
AGE Overall 7.991 0.642 0.000 8.994 38130 
LIQ Overall 15.029 21.392 0.017 613.781 45151 
CAP Overall 2.653 2.813 0.165 10.654 45832 
PRO Overall 0.050 0.132 -0.490 0.635 45832 
RCV Overall 0.077 0.267 0 1 45832 
 
Table Note: As this is panel data, it is important that there is variation both within (individuals across time) and 
between (individuals over time). These types of variation are shown in the dependent variables to keep the table a 
reasonable size. For panel data studies, this is important to show (Katchova, 2014), although often omitted in journal 
studies.  
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Table 3: Pooled OLS, FE and RE signs and significance13 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
VARIABLES TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
L.TOB    +*** +*** +***       
L.ROA          +*** + +*** 
QFI +*** +** +*** +*** + +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +* +*** 
MFJ +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
FUC  + + -*  + +* + +  +* +** 
FRE + + +** + + + - - - + - + 
FLP + - - + - -* -*** - -** -* - -** 
SHC -** - -** -* + -*** +*** +*** +*** +** +*** +*** 
SHQ +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** + -* - + - + 
MFC +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
BSH + + + +*** + +** +** +*** +*** + + + 
IND +*** + + + - + + + + + + - 
CEO + + + +*** + +*** - - - - - - 
NNP -*** +*** +*** -*** + - + +*** +*** + +* +* 
OCH - - - + -** - + - - + - + 
CEN - + + -** + - - + + -*** + + 
LOC - + + - + - + + + -** +* +** 
PRI + + + - + + +*** +*** +*** + +*** +*** 
SIZ -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
DAR + +*** +*** + +*** + -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
AGE +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** + -* -*** + - - 
LIQ +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***       
CAP + -*** -*** +*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** -*** 
RCV -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** -*** -*** -** -*** -*** 
PRO +*** +*** +*** - - -       
OTU +    -     -**   
Constant +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** -** - -*** -* - -*** 
Observations 33129 33129 33129 27294 27294 27294 33919 33919 33919 27897 27897 27897 
R-squared 0.356   0.777   0.177   0.220   
Number of stkcd  1181 1181  1180 1180  1181 1181  1178 1178 
Adjusted R-squared  0.514   0.759   0.133   0.140  
 
 
                                                    
 
13 This regression table summarizes the signs (+/-) and significance (***, ** and * 
represent p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively) on all variables introduced in the 
data section. The full table including coefficients and standard errors for each variable is 
included in Appendix 7. 
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables Regressions (Second Stages) and GMM (Second Stages) 
 
IV Second Stage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 IV-OLS FE RE IV-OLS FE RE IV-OLS FE RE 
VARIABLE TOB/I TOB/I TOB/I TOB/H TOB/H TOB/H TOB/5 TOB/5 TOB/5 
QFI/H/5 0.128 0.036 0.121 1.776*** 2.509*** 2.194*** 3.296* 6.704** 4.811*** 
 (0.149) (0.313) (0.170) (0.584) (0.919) (0.426) (1.875) (3.254) (1.427) 
Hansen's J P val 0.193 0.199  0.147 0.0241  0.204 0.180  
Shea QF 0.085 0.022  0.170 0.070  0.184 0.083  
Shea MF 0.014 0.002  0.016 0.002  0.015 0.002  
Robust Endogeneity Test  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Number of firms  1146 1164  1154 1171  1146 1164 
 
Table Note: The tables show IV specifications using different QFII variable versions. TOB/I indicates QFI used; 
TOB/H indicates QFH used—in this case QFH=1 only if percentage held by QFII in firm is ≥5%. TOB/5 indicates 
QF5 used—only considering the top 5 shareholder, the percentage held by QFII. All variables from the previous 
specifications are not reported but were included as controls. Principal Component regressions are not reported, but 
yielded similar results.  First stage results are not reported. Hausman test p-value (H0: Fixed effects preferred model): 
0.000 consistently.  
 
GMM Second Stage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE TOB/I TOB/I TOB/H TOB/H TOB/5 TOB/5 
L.TOB  0.320***  0.322***  0.322*** 
  (0.0282)  (0.0295)  (0.0297) 
QFI/H/5 (A) 0.133** 0.0985* 0.597* 0.654** 1.762 1.653* 
QFI/H/5 (B) 0.288*** 0.291*** 0.729* 0.707*** 2.427* 1.978** 
 (0.0712) (0.0553) (0.392) (0.216) (1.474) (0.972) 
Hansen's J: P value (A) 0.803 0.900 0.862 0.996 0.848 0.900 
Hansen's J: P value (B) 0.698 0.888 0.168 0.987 0.716 0.900 
 
Table note: Number of lags used were 16 for levels and differences. TOB/I indicates QFI used; TOB/H indicates QFH 
used TOB/5 indicates QF5 used.  All variables are not reported but were included as controls in regression (A). 
Coefficients on QFI/H/5 after principal component analysis reducing all remaining variables to orthogonal 
components of which the 3 capturing most variability were used are reported as (B). 
  
 
6. Discussion & Analysis 
 
Discussion of Regression Results 
 
In terms of the first set of regression results, at first glance (pooled OLS using cluster robust 
standard errors—see table 3 and appendix 7), there is a significant association between QFII presence 
and performance. This generally holds in a cluster robust fixed effects (FE) model, in addition to a 
random effects specification. The former—FE—was preferred from Hausman tests and makes sense 
intuitively—there are likely to be unobserved firm characteristics that hold over time. The results go 
for both of the two measures of performance as dependent variables. We can certainly reject the 
statement made in hypotheses 1 and accept that there is an association between QFII presence and 
performance using both measures. 
The R2 / adjusted R2 are well in excess of one third for the OLS and fixed effects regressions on 
the TOB variable, the former suggesting variability in the explanatory variables explain about 36% of 
the variability in the regressands in the pooled model (table 11 of appendix 7). Of particular interest are 
the empirical and economic significance of the presence of the QFII investor in top shareholdings.  
The 0.1 QFI coefficient in the fixed effects specification on Tobin’s Q can be interpreted as QFII 
being positively associated with Tobin’s Q. If we infer causality, the ceteris paribus interpretation is 
that a QFII being present is associated with a 0.1 increase in Tobin’s Q, which is about 7% of one 
overall standard deviation (across time and individuals) and 10% of the standard deviation from the 
average Tobin’s Q for an individual firm across time (i.e. the within firm standard deviation – see table 
2). The economic significance in these initial models are not enormous, but the empirical significance 
is substantial. The pooled model coefficient shows both empirical and economic significance. 
Even though the association between QFII and ROA is significant empirically, it is less 
economically significant than the Tobin’s Q association. From the dynamic fixed effects model, the 
where a QFI is present, associated firm ROA is 0.003 higher, ceteris paribus—only around 1% of a 
standard deviation of ROA either overall or within a firm. 
Readers will also note that there are a lot of explanatory variables. We do this so as to avoid 
omitted variable bias. However, too many variables can also be problematic. Therefore, in addition to 
the specification below, we also ran an (unreported) principal component analysis based model with 
three principal components accounting for substantial variation in the explanatory variables as a whole, 
finding similar results for the separated QFII presence variable.  
The significance of other foreign related variables and both firm characteristic controls and 
corporate governance variables are of further note. We are hard-pressed to offer a detailed analysis of 
these due to spacing and staying on topic. However, their significance in several instances, along with 
the significance of time dummies and industry dummies (unreported) confirm that they should indeed 
have been included in the regressions.  
 
Sensitivity and Robustness 
 
The relations above hold similarly using the QFH[igh] variable—whereby only firms with ≥5% 
held by QFII were considered are (Table 12 of appendix 7). Using the pooled/panel OLS/FE/RE 
approach, we compared firms with a combined QFII investment equal to or greater than 5% (QFH) with 
those with less than or equal to 1% and found the aforementioned relationships held convincingly for 
the higher proportion, but not for the lower proportion. We did this also using the percentage of shares 
held by QFII among the top 5 (QF5) shareholders and top 10 shareholders (QF10), with similar results 
(tables unreported). Since there was evidence of serial correlation of errors and a higher stake held is 
indicative of greater incentives, we suggest this second set of tables in Appendix 7 ought to provide 
more valid OLS, FE and RE estimates of parameters. We reject the statements of hypotheses 2a and 2b, 
and accept that the extent of QFII ownership is relevant to the association between QFII and Chinese 
firm performance.  
  
In spite of using lags, we are still left with a reverse causality concern and seek to address this in 
a number of ways. 
The empirical significance of QFII in the first regressions could still be considered an issue of 
reverse causality—foreign investors, having foresight, could be selective about the firms they invest in 
and thus choose better performing companies. The potential for endogeneity in the model also seemed 
to be indicated by a significant robust endogeneity test. 
The first stage results of straightforward 2SLS (unreported) required predicting a binary 
variable without a non-linear (i.e. logit) transformation. This may have caused undue magnification in 
some of our stage two coefficients for instrumental variables.  
Running the system GMM on the specification of the equation (above), which we did also using 
principal components (unreported) seems to show a positive and significant result on QFI, QFH and 
QF5. A high Hansen’s J statistic was produced (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982), accepting the null 
hypothesis for the test that the instruments as a group were exogenous. Tables 3 and 4 provide 
interesting back up in the causality question.   
Shea’s partial R2 values were slightly low which can suggest instrument weakness, but still 
higher than 0.1 for the QFI instrument in several cases. The p-value on QFII variables is <0.01 (highly 
significant) when considering only firms with a ≥5% QFII stake. Most exogenous instruments were 
significant. The overidentification statistics demonstrate instrument validity in the model in addition to 
the F-statistic (first stage) being well above 10, which is desirable. 
The GMM (4) results can be interpreted as the model that is most robust to endogeneity and 
thus deals most effectively with possible biasedness in the parameter estimates. The resultant 
parameters can be interpreted as marginal effects just as with OLS regression. Therefore, the model 
suggests that in the presence of a QFII stake held of greater than 5% (singly or jointly), an associated 
Tobin’s Q increase of 0.65 is to be expected on average from the model’s prediction in 95% of repeated 
samples, all other things being equal. This finding is highly significant both empirically and 
economically, since it is about half of one standard deviation of Tobin’s Q over the entire dataset. 
Results using principal components were slightly higher, but rounded also to 0.7. For any amount of 
QFII in the holdings, 0.1 remains the average effect on Tobin’s Q ceteris paribus on the unit change in 
QFII presence (from 0 to 1), the same as the fixed effect result. We therefore reject the statement of 
hypothesis 3 and accept the conjecture that QFII presence positively impacts Tobin’s Q.  
 
Analysis and Intepretation 
 
QFII presence seems to be positively associated with Tobin’s Q in a way which is both 
empirically and economically significant.  
While significantly associated with book performance under OLS and fixed effects empirically, 
the model shows they are unlikely to have had a substantial economic impact on ROA, according to the 
magnitude of the coefficients. In other words, although the association of QFII and ROA is significant 
empirically, it is less economically significant than the Tobin’s Q association.  
We interpret this as the QFII presence acting as an indirect monitoring mechanism, both as a 
signal to the market primarily and in their presence, exerting monitoring pressure on Chinese 
management, whose firms and reputations could suffer were QFII to sell, and/or go to press if unhappy 
with managerial and hence, company and market performance. This section explores some of the 
mechanisms by which either the causal process or a positive feedback loop might occur. 
In addition to the pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive governance stances identified in the 
literature review, we suggest from this paper, that foreign portfolio investors could also exhibit a 
passive-reactive tendency, whereby they possess no particularly active stance on corporate governance, 
except for say, exercising their voting rights (being passive), but they can take positive action in 
response to the failure of a company to fulfill their return expectations, i.e. by liquidating their position 
(reacting). This could act as an indirect governance mechanism. As Douma, et al. (2002) point out:  
 
  
It is in the fund manager’s interest to outperform this [composite benchmark] index and the 
competitors. To do this, he/she is constantly on the look out for stocks, which will enable his/her 
portfolio to do that. A fund manager is therefore far more likely to use the exit option rather than 
the voice option in relation to an under performing stock. 
(Douma, et al., 2006, p. 31) 
 
If foreign investors also provide a signal to the market, this would explain a significant 
association with a better measure that takes market performance into consideration. Provided this is not 
due to endogeneity bias, it can be interpreted as having a causal element, and our robustness exercises 
suggest this to be the case. Conventional wisdom suggests that QFIIs are sophisticated institutional 
investors, who are good at selecting good stocks. Therefore, the firms that attract QFIIs should be those 
who have better performance compared with other A-share companies. Empirically, these firms will 
have better accounting profits and better stock market performance. QFII’s typically small stakes of 
ownership make them less likely to have a significant impact on invested companies.  
Our findings therefore support the following conjecture: in the Chinese case, QFII have had the 
potential to offer a leveraged form of monitoring power in China—and their presence is likely to 
augment market perception of firm value. The potential for an exit signal and the implications in the 
Chinese market with its herding tendencies, and less so, the concomitant pressure on company 
management and shareholders to ‘save face’—i.e. not lose their foreign investor—could be considered 
to form an indirect governance mechanism. 
That this could be occurring in spite of their voting power being incommensurate to decision 
making within the firm, or control of the firm. This could be a plausible argument in the Chinese context, 
but it is difficult to model empirically due to the low percentages held by QFII.  In practical terms, 
foreign investors could go to the international media and mar the investment profile of the Chinese 
company and manager as well as using the ‘exit option’. Neither the companies, nor the Chinese 
government want this, lending powerful away-from (poor performance, corruption) motivation. Foreign 
institutional investors can also interact directly with senior management, for example, demanding 
specific questions around accounting irregularities do not go unanswered, from which managers 
themselves can learn. Combined with their providing a signaling effect to a market notorious for herding 
and casino-like speculation, their presence is likely to weigh importantly on the minds of management 
and other significant shareholders, including state actors. As consultants Leckie and Xiao (2012) 
pointed out:  
 
Though QFII holdings still only account for less than 1% of total stock market holdings, 
their influence far outweighs their relative size. They are watched closely by many domestic 
investors due to the depth of their fundamental research and relatively sophisticated approach to 
risk management and selection. 
Leckie & Xiao (2012: 17) 
 
The policy expectation for foreign investors to act as a governance mechanism in China and to 
have an influence outweighing their ownership stakes (Leckie & Xiao, 2012) seems to be supported by 
the results of our models. This goes against the orthodox intuition that small voting proportion 
necessitates little influence. However, from the statistical models, it is clear that the effect is one which 
is manifested with greater economic significance taking into account the secondary share market’s 
valuation rather than within the company’s inner workings as reflected by profitability. 
The findings of this paper provide evidence to support the policy decisions of the regulators on 
increasing QFII allowances. This process should be further incentivized and promoted, while QFII can 
afford to be more demanding of their invested firms given a leveraged form of monitoring power. 
Promoting QFII as a method to raise capital from foreign investors seems to have improved both the 
finances and corporate governance oversights of public Chinese firms. Policymakers should be opening 
  
their domestic security markets for greater participation by foreigners. However, they must be pressing 
in their demands for higher standards of governance and integrity themselves and see foreign investors 
as supplementary rather than a driving force in governance reform in China, nevertheless increasing 
their incentives by allowing greater levels of ownership to try to change that. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Foreign investors have been considered desirable for their experience and sophistication, their 
capital and their potential to influence corporate governance positively. In the Chinese listed companies, 
they have therefore been allowed increasingly by regulators to take up substantial positions/holdings in 
Chinese shares.  
What we have seen since 2002 is the introduction of foreign investment directly into the domestic 
Chinese stock market via A shares, and this has the potential for rapid and prolific expansion. For 
example, in 2013, the QFII quotas have been said to have increased from around $30 billion USD in 
2012 to $150 billion USD (Tan and Chen, 2013 14 ), coupled with lower restrictions on entry 
requirements, the most profound shift since inception of the program.  
More recently, policymakers have been demanding a shift away from reliance on bank debt 
financing, calling for structural change and improvements in efficiency (Ruan, 2013)15. Expedition of 
financial liberalization has thus become more important for the Chinese government and regulators, 
particularly in light of the de facto liberalization spurred by off-balance sheet banking practices in 
addition to China’s shadow banking sector (trusts, leasing companies, credit-guarantee outfits and 
money-market funds that often borrow from regulated banks, and relend at higher rates). This has 
become a major concern for the Chinese government.  
The interest of this paper has been those firms that have managed to attract or be approved for 
internal investment from foreign investors, especially QFII, but are not listed abroad, nor are in the 
financial industry. Such firms have the potential to be the role models for listed firms in China desiring 
to attract foreign investment, and to benefit from the potential impact of foreign investment on their 
governance and performance. These have been overlooked firms in terms of foreign investment in listed 
companies in China. A pooled OLS approach was taken to a panel of firms obtained from the Chinese 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases. The time series spanned quarterly from 
2003 to 2012. We resorted to fixed effects to firstly address the bias and inconsistency wrought by 
unobserved heterogeneity and to secondly mitigate partially the potential for reverse causality in the 
model. For robusticity, the 2SLS instrumental variables and GMM approaches were used.  
A positive association was found between the presence of a QFII and a company’s market 
performance and book performance, the former being both empirically and economically significant, 
the latter, being empirically significant, offering a revision to Tan’s (2009; 2013) theses. 
Shen, Lu & Wu (2009), Tan, (2013) and Luo, et al., (2014)16 all document foreign investor 
contributions to governance and efficiency in Chinese banks. With respect to foreign investors more 
widely into listed companies, we interpret allowing greater portfolio investment into China as a 
regulatory desire for a convergence in the governance benefits foreign investors can bring, i.e. between 
what they have produced for the banking system with what they could do for domestic NASOs – firms 
outside of OODL and financial-ASO (FASO) categories. Specifically, we found a non-financial, 
                                                     
 
14  Tan, Clement and Chen, Michelle, 13 January, 2013 for Reuters:  
‘China can increase 10 times the level of RQFII, QFII quotas -CSRC head’ Accessed 22/4/2014 from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/14/china-rqfii-idUSH9N09R00Y20130114 
 
15 Ruan, Victoria in the South China Morning Post, 11/9/2013, ‘Li Keqiang stresses China need for 
structural reforms’ 
 
16 Forthcoming paper 
  
domestic Chinese listed firm with 5% or more QFII share ownership offers a 0.7 higher Tobin’s Q on 
average than a firm without, all other things held equal, and with any amount of QFII investment among 
the top ten shareholders, a Tobin’s Q of 0.1 higher. 
Foreign investors could contribute towards the mitigation of agency problems in non-financial 
Chinese listed companies. One interpretation is that the effect of a QFII in top shareholdings augments 
herding behaviour by the market more broadly. However, there may also be a managerial impact or 
influence, both subjects for further research. If it is the case that QFII have possessed such an influence, 
they may possess a form of leverage within their shareholdings born of the signalling effect their exit 
would have on firm value. We therefore suggest an indirect governance mechanism by which even 
passive foreign investors could pressure Chinese management who do not want to see their share price 
and reputation erode, i.e. by their exiting the trade in addition to having the ability to spread the bad 
news about, e.g. the company’s governance issues—thus adding to pressure-sensitive and 
insensitive/resistant categories of institutional investors with a third passive-reactive category. 
We suggest further work into the mechanisms through which foreign investors and institutions 
engage with the Chinese listed companies in addition to addressing further the reverse causality issue. 
We also suggest research into the determinants of QFII presence to explore, for example, the extent to 
which measures of risk, such as CAPM beta, or standard deviation of past returns and/or firm 
characteristics contribute to the likelihood of a QFII stake, often amounting to substantial dollar 
amounts held in firm shares held by foreign investors. Furthermore, tests need to be designed in order 
to substantiate or refute the argument that foreign investors during this period in China’s listed company 
and stock market development, have had an influence that outweighs their commensurate ownership 
stakes held. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 5: Companies, capitalization and market performance in China (Selected Years 2004-2012) 
 
Year 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Number of firms 
A Share 1296 1308 1328 1393 
B shares 109 109 107 107 
H SEHK 95 110 128 148 
   
Market Cap 
 
89404 
 
121366 
 
265423 
 
. 
A Share 88114 120567 263221 . 
B shares 1290 800 2202 . 
All H Shares 3375 2395 4420 3931 
 
Turnover 
 
90469 
 
267113 
 
545634 
 
. 
A Share 89217 265890 563466 . 
B shares 1252 1222 2168 . 
All H shares 2531 5397 3987 2959 
  
Volume Traded 
 
16145 
 
24131 
 
42152 
 
. 
A Share 15809 23913 41806 . 
B shares 337 219 346 . 
All H shares 248 874 849 634 
 
Index Close Price 
    
Shanghai A 2675 1821 2808 2269 
ShenzhenA 5510 5530 12910 8810 
Shanghai B 130 111 304 245 
ShenzhenB 433 271 825 711 
HSCEI 5413 16007 12751 10235 
     
 
Table Note: “.” – data not available 
 
Source: Shanghai and Shenzhen Statistical Yearbooks (2004-2012). Full table containing all 
years and expansions (e.g. high, low, open prices) is available on request 
 
  
  
Figure 1: Market Index Performances of Shanghai and Shenzhen A and B shares 
 
 
 
Source:  CSMAR Data
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Appendix 2 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative QFII Quotas and Licences 
 
 
Figure 3: QFII As a % of Total Market Cap (MC) and Negotiable [Tradable] Market Cap (NMC) 
 
Source: Z-Ben Advisors (2003-2011); Global Times  (2012 licenses); Bloomberg  (2012 quota); 
CSMAR (annual market capitalization, FX rates for 2003-2012 ). 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table 6: Examples of routes/modes of share ownership for foreign investors/institutions in China 
 
Company 
Name 
Foreign investment 
type/information 
Shareholding information 
Guangdong 
Midea Electric 
Appliances (GD Midea) 
 
QFIIs were the second (Q2), 
third (Q4) and ninth (Q4) largest 
shareholder in 2008 
Morgan-Stanley International held 4.29%, Credit 
Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited owned 3.24% while 
Nomura Securities held 1.09%, respectively. 
Western Mining 
Co 
Second Largest shareholder is a 
foreign strategic investment stake with 
10% in 2007 sold down to 5.01% by 
end of 2008 
 
The company had 10% of its shares held by 
Goldman Sach’s strategic investment (Delaware) at end 
of Q2 2007 sold down to 5.01% by end of Q4 2008 and 
4.8% in 2009. 
Tonling 
Nonferrous Metal 
Group 
0.85% of all the company’s 
shares, the tenth largest shareholder in 
the company is held by a sino-foreign 
mutual fund joint-venture 
 
 
Agricultural Bank of China - Invesco Great Wall 
Domestic Demand Growth No.2 Stock Type Securities 
Investment Fund 
Zhuhai Zhongfu 
Enterprises 
Largest shareholder was Asia 
Bottles (HK) Company Limited 
 
Ownership of 29% of shares designated as the 
foreign legal person share type. 
Sichuan Hongda 
Chemical Industry 
Industrial Commercial Bank of 
China – Lombarda was the sixth largest 
shareholder 
0.46% of the company’s A share securities owned 
by the ICBC-Lombarda sino-foreign mutual fund - China 
New Trend Stock Fund 
PetroChina PetroChina has 11.4% of its 
company’s shares registered with the 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing 
Company Ltd at the end of Q4 2008 
Top negotiable shareholders were Templeton, 
JPMorgan and BlackRock, respectively owning 6.02%, 
5.66%, 5.01% of the H sharesi. 
Zhejiang Geely 
Holding 
Company is listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong, while 
productive assets headquartered from 
Hangzhou, China 
From the 2011 Annual Report: Goldman Sachs has a 
17.41% stake in the company, while Delaware registered 
company Gehicle Investment Holdings / Parallel 
Holdings (Mauritius) own 15.35% and 2.05% 
respectively. Not listed in China. 
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Table 7: QFII present in companies over the years during any quarter (from sample) 
 
 
Table 8: QFII distribution by industry in 2009 (from sample) 
 
CSRC 
Letter17/Industry 
Number 
of firms in 
sample 
Firms 
with a QFII in 
top 
shareholdings 
% of 
firms with a 
top QFII 
holding 
A: Agriculture 26 2 7.7 
B: Mining 38 2 5.3 
C: Manufacturing 613 84 13.7 
D: Power 61 6 9.8 
E: Construction 26 4 15.4 
F: Retail 48 8 16.7 
G: Transport 52 5 9.6 
H:Accommodation 91 13 14.3 
J: Telecoms 106 4 3.8 
K: Real Estate 32 3 9.4 
L: Leasing 17 1 5.9 
M: Research 47 1 2.1 
Total 1,157.00 133 11.5 
 
Source: CSMAR data cross-checked with Leckie & Xiao (2012) QFII list 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
17 New CSRC codes begin with these identifying letters and further subdivide, 
generally into 3 digit codes. Old codes simply categorized into 6 sectors – Industry, Public 
Utilities, Commerce, Conglomerates and Finance. 
Year Number of 
firms 
in Sample 
Firms with a QFII 
in top shareholdings 
% 
2003 1,116 6 1 
2004 1,169 55 5 
2005 1,147 89 8 
2006 1,123 177 16 
2007 1,025 208 20 
2008 1,109 174 16 
2009 1,087 191 18 
2010 1,089 208 19 
2011 1,141 158 14 
2012 1,157 133 11 
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Table 9: Discriminating between non-ASOs, the ASO sample set and the FASO and NASO subsets 
 
 
 Description Company 
Examples18 
Information  
Non-ASO 
Companies 
Firms with an 
offshore/overseas or 
B share listing 
SHSE19: 
601336 
(SEHK): 
1336 
New China 
Xinhua Life 
Insurance Company 
Ltd. 
 
SHSE: 
601899 
(SEHK: 
2899) 
Zijin Mining 
Group Company 
Limited 
 
These companies are in 
financial or related to strategic 
sectors, i.e. Insurance; Mining and 
Dressing of Non-ferrous Metals; 
respectively. Each have a Shanghai 
listed A share and an additional H 
share listing on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong (SEHK). They are 
examples of what are described 
above as Non-ASO companies. 
ASO 
Companies 
Any A share 
only company  
  
FASO 
Companies 
Financial A 
share only 
companies 
FASO ∈ 
ASO 
SZSE: 783 
Changjiang 
Securities Company 
Limited 
 
SHSE: 
600015  
Hua Xia 
Bank 
A securities and a banking 
institution both of which have A 
shares, but do not have concurrent 
segmented listings, hence 
illustrative of the FASO designation 
above.  
NASO 
companies 
 
Non-financial 
A share only 
companies 
NASO ∈ 
ASO 
NASOs = 
ASOs – FASOs 
 
SZSE: 1896 
Henan 
Yuneng Holdings 
Co., Ltd. 
 
SHSE: 
600255 
Anhui Xinke 
New Materials Co., 
Ltd. 
These two companies, in 
production of electricity and 
copper processing, 
respectively, are examples of the 
companies of interest here. They are 
the much larger subset of ASOs, 
which are themselves a substantial 
subset of all firms (see Tables 2-3) 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
 
18 Two companies in from are taken arbitrarily to provide illustration for non-ASO and FASO companies. 
19 Codes for the company on the respective exchange 
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Table 10: Independent variables summary & ex-ante predictions 
 
Variable Represents or is a 
proxy for 
Previous Findings Ex-ante prediction Calculation and 
unit of variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Foreign Investor Variables: 
 
 
  
QFI/QFH/QF5 QFII presence in top 10 
shareholders; QFII 
presence >5% in top 10; 
QFI percentage among 
top 5 shareholders; QFI 
percentage among top 
10 shareholders 
Several studies have 
found foreign 
ownership beneficial to 
company performance, 
generally at higher 
levels than exist on the 
whole in China. For 
example, in a case 
where no evidence in 
that regard was found 
(the case of India as 
studied by 
Balasubramanian, et al. 
(2008), foreign 
ownership stakes were 
very small indeed. 
We make no ex-ante 
predictions on the 
variables of interest 
in this paper, given 
the conflicting 
nature of previous 
results and the lack 
of previous research 
in the Chinese case, 
matters which have 
already been 
discussed at length. 
Especially, the issue 
of causality 
warrants caution in 
the interpretations. 
 
List of QFII 
made, ownership 
configurations 
explored for 
existence of 
shareholder 
name in top 
shareholdings. 
Dummy 
variable. 
+/- 
MFJ Presence of a sino-
foreign mutual fund in 
top ownership 
As above, but for 
list of sino-
foreign mutual 
funds. Dummy 
variable. 
+/- 
FLP Company has foreign 
legal person shares in 
issue 
Check share 
types in each 
quarter in top ten 
shareholdings 
for foreign legal 
person shares. 
Dummy variable 
+/- 
FRE Company reports 
related party 
transactions with a 
foreign entity 
Accounting 
dataset specifies 
whether or not 
there is a foreign 
related party 
among top ten 
transactions 
going in/out of 
the company. 
Dummy 
variable. 
+/- 
FUC Ultimate controller of 
the company is a foreign 
citizen 
Ultimate 
ownership 
dataset is 
examined for 
foreign ultimate 
owner (see tables 
in section 2.3.6) 
+/- 
Corporate governance and other control variables 
 
  
No. 1 
shareholder 
concentration 
and its square 
 
(SHC, SHQ) 
Ownership 
concentration 
Support for a ‘U’ 
shaped (non-linear) 
hypothesis (Bai, et al., 
2003), whereby very 
low or very high 
concentrations are more 
desirable since low 
concentration reduces 
power to expropriate 
whereas very high 
concentration is 
Relationship 
between shareholder 
concentration 
squared and 
performance will be 
positive. 
Derived variable 
from number one 
shareholder 
concentration. 
Continuous 
percentage 
variable. 
+ 
  
synonymous with cash-
flow incentives. 
Ratio of 
independent to 
dependent 
directors on the 
board 
 
(IND) 
Board Independence Very mixed. It is 
difficult to have a truly 
independent board. 
Enron, the classic 
corporate governance 
disaster case had 
excellent board 
independence. 
A higher ratio of 
independent board 
members is 
conducive of better 
performance. 
Alternatively, just 
window dressing. 
Derived from 
number of 
independent 
directors and 
total directors 
Continuous 
percentgae 
variable. 
+ 
CEO is 
chairman or 
vice-chairman 
of the board of 
directors 
 
(CEO) 
Agency conflict in 
control of company 
policy 
Mixed evidence, but 
agency theory suggests 
CEO as chair is 
dangerous to board 
independency (see 
chapter 3). 
A CEO chairman or 
vice-chairman is 
negatively 
associated with 
performance. 
Derived from 
board structure 
and executive 
datasets. 
Dummy 
variable. 
- 
Percentage of 
shares held by 
top executives 
(BSH) 
Managerial incentive Corporate governance 
principles and agency 
theory suggest that 
aligning corporate 
insider interests with 
shareholder wealth 
maximization facilitates 
that. On the other hand, 
executives can 
maniplulate stock 
prices, e.g. to coincide 
with option expiration. 
Higher percentage 
of shares held by 
executives is 
conducive of better 
performance. 
Derived from 
executive 
shareholding 
dataset. 
Continuous 
percentage 
variable. 
+ 
Natural log of 
the sum of 
squared 
concentration of 
shares held by 
the second to 
tenth 
shareholder 
 
(MFC) 
Market for corporate 
control 
2-10 shareholders – it 
has been argued that 
takeover threats are an 
important form of 
managerial discipline 
Cunat, Gine & 
Guadalupe, (2012).   
The higher the ratio 
(higher the natural 
log), the greater the 
ability of the other 
top shareholders to 
lobby together 
against the number 
one shareholder in 
decisions 
detrimental to their 
interests, thus 
positive effect on 
performance. 
From ownership 
dataset. 
Herfindahl 
index. Log is 
taken following 
Bai, et al. (2003) 
as relationship is 
linear when 
logged. 
+ 
(CAP) Capital to sales ratio Proxy for the efficiency 
with which the firm is 
utilizing its capital to 
produce new revenue  
No ex-ante 
prediction 
Derived from 
accounting and 
financial data. 
Fixed Capital /  
Operating 
Revenuue 
+ 
(PRO) Operating income to 
sales ratio 
Proxy for profit margin No ex-ante 
predictions. 
Derived from 
accounting and 
financial dataset. 
Operating 
income / 
Operating 
Revenue. 
+ 
Ultimate 
ownership 
STA (CEN / 
LOC) 
PRI 
[FUC] 
OUT 
Central/Local/Private 
ultimate owner 
General view is that the 
state a shareholder is 
unfavourable, however, 
in China, firstly, the 
state has an interest in 
upholding the 
credibility of ‘flagship’ 
Chinese companies and 
Consensus seems to 
dictate that the state 
is not a good 
shareholder, and that 
privately controlled 
companies seem to 
perform better. 
However, Chen, et 
al’s (2009) findings 
Derived from 
ultimate 
ownership 
dataset (see 
tables in section 
2.3.6). Dummy 
variables.  
STA – 
PRI + 
  
secondly, the findings 
of Chen et al. (2009) 
contradict this, so a 
similar 
disaggregation is 
used, but no ex-ante 
prediction. 
Ownership 
chain 
(OCH) 
The degree of 
separation between 
ownership/control and 
cash-flow rights 
Separation of control 
and cash-flow 
rights/ownership chains 
give rise to firms with 
higher likelihood/ease 
of expropriation by 
insiders, see e.g. Morck, 
et al. (2005) 
Companies with an 
ownership chain 
structure are more 
vulnerable to 
expropriation since 
the control of the 
company can lie 
outside the hands of 
those with cash-flow 
rights interests. 
Variable 
provided as a 
discrepancy 
between annual 
report and 
researched 
ultimate 
ownership. 
- 
CSRC 
reprimand 
dummy (RCV) 
CSRC has made a ruling 
and taking action 
against that company, 
e.g. fining, 
reprimanding or issuing 
a warning 
Indicates the company 
has issues with the 
standard of accounting 
and checks and 
balances on 
management. 
Likely to have a 
negative impact on 
market value. 
Any ruling I the 
quarter 
converted to a 
binary variable 
- 
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Table 11: Full regression output tables 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
 
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
VARIABLES 
 
TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Yt-1 
 
   0.8161*** 0.7298*** 0.8612***   0.2223*** 0.1007 0.2298*** 
 
 
   (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0123)    (0.0707) (0.0679) (0.0747) 
QFI 
 
0.2563*** 0.0454** 0.0699*** 0.0695*** 0.0044 0.0346*** 0.0089*** 0.0022*** 0.0037*** 0.0061*** 0.0012* 0.0051*** 
 
 
(0.0292) (0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0111) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
MFJ 
 
0.4080*** 0.1863*** 0.2090*** 0.1128*** 0.0745*** 0.0915*** 0.0129*** 0.0054*** 0.0072*** 0.0089*** 0.0050*** 0.0091*** 
 
 
(0.0310) (0.0143) (0.0151) (0.0103) (0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
FUC 
 
 0.0742 0.0600 -0.0396*  0.0095 0.0053* 0.0036 0.0032  0.0087* 0.0068** 
 
 
 (0.0433) (0.0377) (0.0182)  (0.0174) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0035)  (0.0041) (0.0028) 
FRE 
 
0.0648 0.0630 0.0767** 0.0136 0.0269 0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0022 0.0007 
 
 
(0.0459) (0.0360) (0.0377) (0.0146) (0.0546) (0.0121) (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0044) (0.0011) 
FLP 
 
0.0306 -0.0280 -0.0269 0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0142* 
-
0.0064*** -0.0007 -0.0027** -0.0037* -0.0000 -0.0038** 
 
 
(0.0314) (0.0499) (0.0475) (0.0099) (0.0183) (0.0086) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0018) 
SHC 
 
-1.4577** -0.5243 -0.8524** -0.2792* 0.0648 
-
0.2511*** 0.0361*** 0.0741*** 0.0516*** 0.0233** 0.0576*** 0.0252*** 
 
 
(0.5026) (0.4347) (0.4143) (0.1363) (0.1457) (0.0839) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0078) (0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0095) 
SHQ 
 
3.3573*** 2.2156*** 2.4497*** 0.8561*** 0.7495*** 0.6303*** 0.0049 -0.0268* -0.0083 0.0069 -0.0174 0.0036 
 
 
(0.7272) (0.5248) (0.5113) (0.2076) (0.1895) (0.1250) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0096) (0.0089) (0.0167) (0.0103) 
MFC 
 
0.1321*** 0.1190*** 0.1073*** 0.0426*** 0.0544*** 0.0264*** 0.0047*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 
 
 
(0.0186) (0.0122) (0.0116) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
BSH 
 
0.3708 0.2517 0.2606 0.1891*** 0.1882 0.1303** 0.0139** 0.0321*** 0.0224*** 0.0008 0.0070 0.0029 
 
 
(0.2262) (0.3583) (0.2528) (0.0418) (0.1824) (0.0536) (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0053) (0.0031) (0.0114) (0.0024) 
IND 
 
0.9028*** 0.1153 0.1356 0.1220 -0.0338 0.0569 0.0011 0.0110 0.0051 0.0012 0.0112 -0.0041 
 
 
(0.2390) (0.1559) (0.1576) (0.0765) (0.0410) (0.0421) (0.0051) (0.0151) (0.0116) (0.0050) (0.0137) (0.0052) 
CEO 
 
0.0297 0.0160 0.0175 0.0196*** 0.0115 0.0145*** -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0006 
 
 
(0.0211) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0052) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0007) 
NNP 
 
-0.1024*** 0.0576*** 0.0491*** 
-
0.0451*** 0.0016 -0.0070 0.0005 0.0023*** 0.0020*** 0.0002 0.0017* 0.0009* 
 
 
(0.0162) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0074) (0.0083) (0.0047) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
OCH 
 
-0.0079 -0.0227 -0.0172 0.0103 -0.0320** -0.0059 0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0012 
 
 
(0.0419) (0.0283) (0.0261) (0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0099) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0008) 
CEN 
 
-0.0298 0.0341 0.0260 -0.0279** 0.0179 -0.0041 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 
-
0.0054*** 0.0057 0.0028 
 
 
(0.0461) (0.0677) (0.0562) (0.0118) (0.0162) (0.0136) (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0010) (0.0038) (0.0019) 
LOC 
 
-0.0578 0.0322 0.0276 -0.0334 0.0039 -0.0148 0.0023 0.0015 0.0020 -0.0035** 0.0070* 0.0043** 
 
 
(0.0396) (0.0571) (0.0451) (0.0199) (0.0148) (0.0160) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0018) 
PRI 
 
0.0528 0.0783 0.0656 -0.0082 0.0117 0.0186 0.0085*** 0.0117*** 0.0095*** 0.0009 0.0140*** 0.0080*** 
 
 
(0.0413) (0.0711) (0.0609) (0.0195) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0017) 
SIZ 
 -
10.5671*** 
-
17.4934*** 
-
15.5626*** 
-
2.3578*** 
-
6.6119*** 
-
2.0123*** 0.1389*** 0.0994*** 0.1346*** 0.1076*** 0.1187*** 0.1019*** 
 
 
(0.5152) (0.4498) (0.4628) (0.1551) (0.1976) (0.1042) (0.0120) (0.0266) (0.0123) (0.0217) (0.0346) (0.0179) 
DAR 
 
0.0168 0.2819*** 0.2544*** 0.0247 0.1351*** 0.0355 
-
0.0691*** 
-
0.0938*** 
-
0.0846*** 
-
0.0543*** 
-
0.0869*** 
-
0.0546*** 
 
 
(0.1068) (0.0757) (0.0791) (0.0374) (0.0402) (0.0309) (0.0036) (0.0099) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0182) (0.0100) 
AGE 
 
0.3989*** 0.2541*** 0.2301*** 0.0428*** 0.0716*** 0.0227*** 0.0002 -0.0021* 
-
0.0021*** 0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0007 
 
 
(0.0482) (0.0301) (0.0288) (0.0082) (0.0136) (0.0048) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0006) 
LIQ 
 
0.0258*** 0.0164*** 0.0161*** 0.0103*** 0.0075*** 0.0046***      
 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)       
  
CAP 
 
0.0156 -0.0245*** -0.0270*** 0.0198*** 
-
0.0058*** 
-
0.0034*** 
-
0.0030*** 
-
0.0016*** 
-
0.0019*** 
-
0.0026*** -0.0013** 
-
0.0016*** 
 
 
(0.0089) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
RCV 
 
-0.1768*** -0.2124*** -0.2179*** 
-
0.0500*** 
-
0.0893*** 
-
0.0259*** -0.0109** 
-
0.0135*** 
-
0.0138*** -0.0099** 
-
0.0127*** 
-
0.0114*** 
 
 
(0.0285) (0.0259) (0.0229) (0.0049) (0.0194) (0.0053) (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0041) 
PRO 
 
1.1655*** 0.7674*** 0.8284*** -0.0798 -0.0584 -0.0526       
 
 
(0.1303) (0.0939) (0.0966) (0.0865) (0.0662) (0.0591)       
OUT 
 
0.0273    -0.0103     -0.0076**   
 
 
(0.0645)    (0.0381)     (0.0025)   
Constant 
 
10.4650*** 18.5880*** 16.9004*** 2.7182*** 7.0061*** 2.2403*** -0.0618** -0.0132 
-
0.0454*** -0.0531* -0.0466 
-
0.0445*** 
 
 
(0.4611) (0.5571) (0.5087) (0.1900) (0.2336) (0.1033) (0.0240) (0.0289) (0.0162) (0.0252) (0.0323) (0.0155) 
Observations 
 
33129 33129 33129 27294 27294 27294 33919 33919 33919 27897 27897 27897 
R-squared 
 
0.3564   0.7771   0.1769   0.2201   
Number of stkcd 
 
 1181 1181  1180 1180  1181 1181  1178 1178 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
 0.5144   0.7587   0.1331   0.1400  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
VARIABLES TOB TOB ROA ROA TOB TOB ROA ROA 
Yt-1 
    0.7147*** 0.7707*** 0.0817*** 0.1481*** 
     (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0057) 
QFH 0.1583** 0.1766** 0.0016 0.0047 0.1713*** 0.2066*** 0.0008 0.0052 
 (0.0710) (0.0695) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0611) (0.0577) (0.0055) (0.0053) 
MFJ 0.1248*** 0.1631*** 0.0050*** 0.0067*** 0.0756*** 0.1134*** 0.0051*** 0.0071*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0095) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
FUC 0.1618*** -0.0054 0.0029 0.0029 0.0047 -0.0414 0.0102*** 0.0075** 
 (0.0495) (0.0457) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0390) (0.0315) (0.0035) (0.0030) 
FRE 0.1008* 0.0609 -0.0047 -0.0005 0.0604 0.0193 -0.0020 0.0004 
 (0.0550) (0.0430) (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0645) (0.0180) (0.0058) (0.0019) 
FLP 0.0970** -0.0107 -0.0005 -0.0030 0.0433* 0.0282 0.0011 -0.0019 
 (0.0429) (0.0384) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0251) (0.0203) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
SHC 0.8046** -1.8691*** 0.0481*** 0.0380*** -0.0935 -0.3741*** 0.0495*** 0.0257** 
 (0.3150) (0.2681) (0.0157) (0.0127) (0.1798) (0.1215) (0.0160) (0.0118) 
SHQ -0.6436* 3.1167*** -0.0101 -0.0028 0.5937*** 1.0684*** -0.0264 0.0055 
 (0.3464) (0.3044) (0.0172) (0.0147) (0.2004) (0.1437) (0.0180) (0.0138) 
MFC -0.0384*** 0.0743*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0317*** 0.0487*** 0.0023*** 0.0032*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0064) (0.0049) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
BSH 0.5427** 0.5066*** 0.0388*** 0.0280*** 0.2035 0.2423*** 0.0084 0.0097 
 (0.2523) (0.1940) (0.0141) (0.0091) (0.1729) (0.0828) (0.0152) (0.0082) 
IND 0.9419*** 0.5872*** 0.0194** 0.0157** 0.2445*** 0.1433** 0.0146* 0.0072 
 (0.1377) (0.1233) (0.0077) (0.0069) (0.0885) (0.0711) (0.0079) (0.0067) 
CEO 0.0296* 0.0112 -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0124 0.0178** -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (0.0177) (0.0158) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0112) (0.0083) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
NNP 0.0633*** -0.0800*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** -0.0433*** -0.0604*** 0.0008 0.0004 
 (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
OCH 0.2894*** 0.0048 -0.0041* -0.0001 0.0193 0.0024 -0.0023 0.0006 
 (0.0331) (0.0255) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0250) (0.0170) (0.0023) (0.0016) 
CEN 0.1294*** -0.0484 -0.0011 -0.0004 0.0286 -0.0296 0.0071** 0.0036 
 (0.0479) (0.0430) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0360) (0.0275) (0.0032) (0.0026) 
LOC 0.1559*** 0.0436 0.0006 0.0017 0.0282 -0.0282 0.0087** 0.0051* 
 (0.0517) (0.0457) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0380) (0.0283) (0.0034) (0.0027) 
PRI 0.2095*** 0.0607 0.0090*** 0.0099*** 0.0321 -0.0036 0.0145*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0420) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0355) (0.0278) (0.0032) (0.0027) 
SIZ -10.5667*** -12.8683*** 0.1250*** 0.1699*** -5.3330*** -3.1952*** 0.1828*** 0.1350*** 
 (0.2310) (0.2256) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.1660) (0.1023) (0.0152) (0.0094) 
DAR 0.1318*** 0.0947*** -0.0958*** -0.0876*** 0.0953*** 0.0527*** -0.0876*** -0.0693*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0338) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0244) (0.0173) (0.0021) (0.0017) 
AGE 1.3914*** 0.5800*** 0.0045*** 0.0016** 0.2535*** 0.0667*** 0.0016 0.0012 
 (0.0284) (0.0173) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0155) (0.0083) (0.0013) (0.0008) 
LIQ 0.0187*** 0.0196***   0.0142*** 0.0120***   
 (0.0003) (0.0003)   (0.0003) (0.0003)   
CAP 0.0418*** 0.0345*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** 0.0334*** 0.0276*** -0.0032*** -0.0031*** 
  
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RCV -0.1868*** -0.2915*** -0.0144*** -0.0127*** -0.1200*** -0.0898*** -0.0133*** -0.0116*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0204) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0166) (0.0139) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
PRO 0.0197 0.1325***   -0.1470*** -0.1023***   
 (0.0400) (0.0384)   (0.0373) (0.0337)   
Constant -0.0098 11.2567*** -0.0754*** -0.1037*** 4.0704*** 3.5267*** -0.1425*** -0.0823*** 
 (0.0214) (0.2642) (0.0054) (0.0125) (0.1517) (0.1308) (0.0158) (0.0122) 
Observations 31948 33129 32738 33919 26114 27294 26719 27897 
Number of stkcd 1180 1181 1180 1181 1178 1180 1178 1178 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2308  0.0772  0.6563  0.0767  
         
Standard errors in parentheses 
       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
       
Table Note:  QFH (QFII High) is same as QFI binary variable except that QFH=1 only if percentage of 
entire firm held by QFII≥5%. Table note: Hausman test p-value (H0: Fixed effects preferred model): 0.000 
consistently. 
